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REFORMING CLIMATE FINANCE
THROUGH INVESTMENT CODES OF CONDUCT
BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON*
I. THE DYADIC QUALITIES OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
Whether environmentally conscious investors can help abate
climate change, and thereby put the economy on more sustainable
foundations, is an important question for policy-makers to consider. The
long-standing movement for socially responsible investment (SRI),
which seeks to harness the resources and power of the financial sector as
a catalyst to change corporate social and environmental behavior, has
become increasingly concerned about a warming climate. The SRI
movement not only seeks to target individual corporate polluters through
divestment, shareholder activism, and other mechanisms of pressure; but
it has also begun to promote a framework for more systemic change
through the propagation of various investment codes of conduct.1 Some
of these codes specifically address global warming, such as the Climate
Principles and the Carbon Disclosure Project, while others seek to
promote SRI more generally, such as the United Nations Principles for
Responsible Investment.2 This Article assesses the contribution of SRI
to climate change and in particular critiques whether the new SRI codes
of conduct offer an effective way of improving how investors respond to
global climate change issues.
This Article begins by examining the dyadic qualities of modern
financial markets in order to explain the broader context in which efforts
to promote environmentally responsible finance must function. While
some actors in the financial sector increasingly perceive that it is in their
financial self-interest to address climate change, a comprehensive,
environmentally responsible response is unlikely to arise from this
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
The Climate Group,
http://www.theclimategroup.org/about/corporate-leadership/climate-principles (last visited Sept.
16, 2009); Carbon Disclosure Project, http://www.cdproject.net (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
2 Principles for Responsible Investment, http://www.unpri.org/principles (last visited Sept. 14,
2009).
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perspective. The movement for SRI, as the second section of the Article
examines, once championed a transformative ethical agenda, but since
the late 1990s SRI's radical edge has been somewhat muted by its drift
towards a pragmatic business case approach to investment decisions.
The third section of the Article focuses on the capacity of SRI to
galvanize action on climate change issues, especially through voluntary
codes of conduct on climate finance. Deficiencies in the aspirations and
design of such codes suggest the need for governmental regulation of the
climate finance market, including reforms to investment institutions'
fiduciary duties, as explained in the final section of the Article.
Before canvassing SRI and the field of climate finance, it is
helpful to understand its broader context, the financial economy itself.
The financial sector transforms money into an instrument of economic
development.' Economic historians have shown how measures of
financial system sophistication, such as the system's liquidity, and stock
and bond market capitalization, positively correlate to economic growth
generally.4 Financial institutions such as banks and pension funds have
become one of the most ubiquitous influences in modem economies,
mobilizing capital resources for new development in the real economy,
brokering financial transactions, and managing investment risks.' Their
influence is so great that economists often describe our era as one of
"finance capitalism."6 Sustained partly by surging household wealth and
the participation of mass society in investment schemes, such as pension
plans and mutual funds, the financial sector has become pivotal to global
economic conditions.7 For instance, in 2005, forty of the one hundred
largest companies in the world were financial firms.8 To Niall Ferguson,
See generally R. GLEN HUBBARD, MONEY, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE ECONOMY 10 (1 st
ed. 1994) (describing the financial system and specifically, the relationship of the monetary
system to economics); PETER ROSE, MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 4 (1994).
4 Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV.
537, 538 (1998); Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be
Right, 108 Q. J. ECON. 717, 734-35 (1993). See also JOHN HICKS, A THEORY OF ECONOMIC
HISTORY 150-51 (1969).
5 See Julie Froud, Adam Leaver & Karel Williams, New Actors in a Financialised Economy and
the Remaking of Capitalism, 12 NEW POL. ECON. 339, 339-40 (2007).
6 GEORGE EDWARDS, THE EVOLUTION OF FINANCE CAPITALISM at vii (1938).
7 See STEPHEN DAVIS, JON LUKOMNIK & DAVID PITT-WATSON, THE NEW CAPITALISTS: How
CITIZEN INVESTORS ARE RESHAPING THE CORPORATE AGENDA 3-5 (2006).
8 See, e.g., MYRIAM VANDER STICHELE, CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY: SOMO
FINANCIAL SECTOR REPORT 9 (SOMO) (2004),
http://somo.nl/html/paginas/pdf/FS-Report full_2004_EN.pdf. And one study in 2000 showed
that, of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations and 49 are nations (based on
484
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Professor of Economic History at Harvard University, such trends are
economically very positive, "financial innovation has been an
indispensable factor in man's advance from wretched subsistence to the
giddy heights of material prosperity that so many people know today."9
Yet, incongruously, the financial economy within which SRI
operates can also wreak great economic, social, and environmental harm.
It has been disparaged as a world of irrational exuberance" and a vector
of economic crisis." The turmoil in international financial markets in
2008 and 2009 that has engendered a deep global economic recession
poignantly demonstrates these hazards. 2 By fuelling economic growth,
often of a wasteful and speculative nature that does not contribute to the
real economy, 3 the finance economy intensifies humanity's ecological
footprint. Financial markets can accelerate trends toward environmental
degradation by allowing capital to be transferred quickly to those
companies that profit from exploitation of the environment. Being further
removed from the environmental impacts of companies and
developments they fund, financial institutions are perhaps even more
inclined to be oblivious to the costs of the environmental externalities
they generate.
In relation to climate change, the financial sector displays a
similar dyadic character. Benignly, financiers are praised for their ability
to help price climate risks and facilitate investment in renewable energy
and efficient technologies. ' The investment community increasingly
perceives some action on climate change as in its financial self-interest,
for it poses risks to the value of their investment portfolios or their
a comparison of corporate revenue and country GDPs). SARAH ANDERSON & JOHN CAVANAGH,
TOP 200: THE RISE OF CORPORATE GLOBAL POWER 3 (2000) http://www.attac-
bem.ch/fileadmin/dokumente/infos/top200-Multis.pdf.
9 NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD 3 (2008).
10 Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance 3-4 (2000).
Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets (Reuven Glick et al. eds., 2001) (explaining the East Asian
financial meltdown of 1997-98).
12 On the crisis, see George Soros, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of
2008 and What it Means (2008); Robert Shiller, The Subprime Solution: How Today's Global
Crisis Happened, and What To Do About IT (2008).
13 Robert Brenner, The World Economy at the Turn of the Millennium: Toward Boom or Crisis, 8
Rev. of Int'l. Pol. Econ. 6 (2001).
14 Sonia Labatt & Rodney White, Carbon Finance: The Financial Implications of Climate Change
(2007); RICHARD B. STEWART, BENEDICT KINGSBURY AND BRYCE RUDYK, CLIMATE FINANCE:
REGULATORY AND FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
(2009), available at http://www.iilj.org/climatefinance/.
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borrowers' solvency through tightening regulations, impairment of
physical assets, and reduced income. 5 Several lawsuits initiated in
North America against major greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters may ignite
fears of a litigation onslaught reminiscent of the anti-tobacco campaign. 6
Further, polluting industries in the oil and gas, heavy manufacturing, and
transport sectors should be competitively disadvantaged by GHG control
regulation; thereby reducing future earnings and hurting their investors
through lower dividend payments and share prices. 7 Civil society groups
increasingly target financial institutions associated with fossil fuel firms.
In 2006, a coalition of mostly United States (U.S.) environmental groups
started a campaign that demanded major banks cease lending to coal
power plants.'8 A report by the International Finance Corporation has
thus assessed climate change as "a particularly powerful catalyst" for the
incorporation of environmental factors into investment decision-
making. "
The financial sector is beginning to respond to such advice.
Collaborative groups such as the Investor Network on Climate Risk ° and
the Institutional Investors' Group on Climate Change2' are raising
awareness of climate issues in the financial sector and educating fund
managers about climate risks and investment opportunities.
Beyond risk management, climate change also creates new
market opportunities for the financial sector. Companies that pioneer
'5 Adam Shell & Matt Krantz, Global Warming a Hot Spot for Investors, USA TODAY, Feb. 27,
2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/us/2007-02-27-global-warming-
usatx.htm; Jeremy Leggett, Climate Change and the Banking Industry: A Question of Both Risk
and Opportunity, BANKERS MAG., July-Aug. 1996, at 25, 25.
'6 J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not Just a Policy Issue for Corporate
Counsel- It's a Legal Issue, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89 (2004); Joyeeta Gupta, Legal Steps
Outside the Climate Convention: Litigation as a Tool to Address Climate Change, 16 REV. OF
EUR. COMMUNITY AND INT'L. ENVTL. L. 76 (2007).
17 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, CHANGING OIL: EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND
SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY (2002) available at
http://pdf.wri.org/changingoil-full.pdf.
18 John Donnelly, Banks are Urged Not to Finance Coal Power, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2007,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/
01 /I 6/banksareurgednottofinancescoal-power.
19 INT'L FIN. CORP., "WHO CARES WHO WINS": ONE YEAR ON 8 (2005).
20 See Investor Network on Climate Risk, Why Climate Change is a Business Issue,
http://www.incr.com (last visited on Sept. 18, 2009).
21 See Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change, http://www.iigcc.org (last visited on Sept.
18, 2009).
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low carbon and energy efficient technologies stand to gain financially.22
Many investors, at least before the global financial crisis in 2008 and
2009, were looking for opportunities in renewable energies, ethanol
production, environmentally efficient technologies, and carbon offset
projects.23 The Kyoto Protocol's provision of several economic policy
instruments to facilitate cost effective reduction of GHG emissions has
also created a means for financial institutions to play a more strategic
role such as being intermediaries for carbon trading and financiers for
Clean Development Mechanism projects.2 ' The World Bank estimated
that the value of the global carbon market reached US$64 billion in 2007
(up from US$31 billion in 2006), mostly associated with the European
Union's GHG trading scheme. 25 The financial sector has also pioneered
voluntary trading schemes, the most successful example being the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). Established in 2003, the CCX is a
trading hub for GHG emission allowances from sources and projects
predominantly in North America.2 6 The CCX members made voluntary
commitments to reduce their GHG emissions in 2010 by six percent
below a baseline period calculated on participating companies' average
annual GHG emissions from 1998-2001.27
Such initiatives exemplify the potential of the financial sector to
create its own mechanisms for climate finance without waiting for
governments to act. Governments by themselves do not have the capital
resources to address the necessary speed of the transition to a low-carbon
economy. Moreover, the slowness of current negotiations on
strengthening the international climate law regime, and the prospect that
political compromises between the North and South will severely
weaken the resulting agreed commitments, make initiatives from the
22 See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR INVESTORS ON CLIMATE
RISK 4 (2004).
23 David Berman, Hot For Green Investing, FIN. POST, Feb. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=29c62bbb-becd-4aOe-9697-
f9837d26301 0&k=16463.
24 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change, art. 3, 37 ILM 22 (1998);
Josef Janssen, Implementing the Kyoto Mechanism: Potential Contributions by Banks and
Insurance Companies, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.-ISSUES & PRACTICE 602 (2000).
2' KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET 2008 59
(2008).
26 See Chicago Climate Exchange, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
27 Chicago Climate Exchange, Emission Reduction Commitment,
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/contentjsfid=72 (last visited Dec. 23, 2009).
Vol. 27, No. 3
Wisconsin International Law Journal
financial sector crucial to mobilizing efforts to a low-carbon
modernization of the economy.
II. CLIMATE FINANCE AND SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE
Beyond being a neutral transactional agent in the emerging
climate finance market or, conversely, a sponsor of the fossil fuel
economy, some investors view climate change as an ethical issue
requiring a more enlightened response to safeguard the planet. The SRI
movement, historically associated with the campaign against investments
in South Africa during its apartheid era, has recently embraced climate
change as one of its critical environmental causes.28 As it has matured,
SRI has sought to influence financial markets through several techniques
including, ethical screens (i.e., excluding assets in problematic firms),
"best-in-class" portfolios (i.e., selecting the firms that act the most
responsibly relative to their peers), shareholder advocacy (i.e., using
shareholder rights to advocate change within companies), and in the
banking sector, financing on preferential terms to socially or
environmentally beneficial projects.29 In recent years, SRI has also
sought to exert change, especially on climate change issues, through the
propagation of codes of conduct and related standards for financial
institutions. Thus, rather than merely targeting individual firms this form
of SRI hopes to engender systematic changes across the market.
Through investment screening, shareholder advocacy, and other
techniques, SRI seeks improvements in corporate social and
environmental behavior beyond the letter of the law. In a sense,
therefore, SRI aspires to be a form of market governance in its own
right.3" Traditionally, when SRI was associated primarily with religious-
based investors who, strictly for ethical reasons, sought to avoid profit
from "sinful" activities such as tobacco, alcohol, or gambling businesses
(a stance associated with deontological ethics), SRI did not aspire to be a
28 See generally SUSAN MEEKER-LOWRY, ECONOMICS AS IF THE EARTH REALLY MATERED: A
CATALYST GUIDE TO SOCIALLY CONSCIOUS INVESTING (1988); SEVERYN T. BRUYN, THE FIELD
OF SOCIAL INVESTMENT (1987); MARCEL JEUCKEN, SUSTAINABLE FINANCE AND BANKING: THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR AND THE FUTURE OF THE PLANET (2001); LABATT & WHITE, supra note 14.
29 BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT LAW: REGULATING THE
UNSEEN POLLUTERS 89-101 (2008).
30 Id.
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means of market governance. Its proponents did not seek to change
corporate behavior; they wished only to avoid profiting from corporate
misdeeds. The divestment movement against the apartheid regime in
South Africa3 marked a seminal shift in SRI towards a teleological (i.e.,
focusing on the consequences of decisions) ethical position; investors
increasingly sought to use their financial resources to leverage positive
change in the world.32 Through shareholder activism, divestment, or
preferential financing, SRI has sought to promote sustainable
development, respect for human rights, and other ethical objectives
valued for their own sake and not merely as a means to gain a financial
advantage. In relation to climate change, SRI may help overcome the
limitations and gaps in official regulation by pushing for early corporate
action to reduce GHG emissions.
Yet, in recent years, the potential of SRI to act as a means of
market governance has diminished as its conceptual basis has shifted
profoundly. By tying social and environmental activism to furthering the
bottom line, SRI has diminished its pretences to stand for change; there
often remains a countervailing business case for financing socially
irresponsible activities. Many SRI actors have jettisoned pretensions to
invest solely or primarily on ethical grounds; instead, they are driven to
tackle social and environmental problems on a business case. The
business case relies on a cost-benefit analysis whereby the relative
financial risks and opportunities of SRI issues are weighed
instrumentally. This approach is said to be congruous with ethical
investment on the assumption that socially responsible choices
increasingly are also financially advantageous ones.33 In the industry's
parlance, SRI is a way to achieve "alpha" (i.e., above-market returns).34
The massive investment in Canada's oil sands, in the province of
31 See, e.g., Russell Sparkes, A Historical Perspective on Growth of Socially Responsible
Investment, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 39, 40-42 (Rory Sullivan & Craig Mackenzie eds.,
2006).
32 Neil Carter & Meg Huby, Ecological Citizenship and Ethical Investment, 14 ENVTL. POL. 255
(2005). Paul H. Dembinski et al., The Ethical Foundations of Responsible Investment, 48 J. OF
BUS. ETHICS 203 (2003).
33 See, e.g., DAVID EDWARDS, THE LINK BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE (1998); RICHIE P. LOWRY, GOOD MONEY: A GUIDE TO PROFITABLE SOCIAL
INVESTING IN THE '90S (199 I).
3 See, e.g., INNOVEST, NEW ALPHA SOURCE FOR ASSET MANAGERS: ENVIRONMENTALLY-
ENHANCED INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS (2003) (discussing above-market advantages with
environmentally sound investment styles).
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Alberta, is one sensational example." Moreover, even if investors wish
to be virtuous, social and environmental values often cannot be factored
into their cost-benefit calculations.36 Values such as biodiversity or
climate integrity cannot be captured by conventional financial accounting
systems unless they give rise to specific expenses and income
attributable to an individual organization.37
From about the late 1990s, as mainstream institutional investors
such as large pension plans came under pressure to be more mindful of
the social and environmental impacts associated with their financing,
they sought to redefine SRI in a way to neutralize its more radical
connotations.38 In line with their fiduciary duties requiring promotion of
optimal financial returns for their beneficiaries, they refrained SRI as a
way to be prosperous rather than simply virtuous.39 Further, financial
institutions have marshaled other arguments to avoid prioritizing ethical
investment. Investing on behalf of thousands or millions of investors,
financial institutions fear immersion in acrimonious and irresolvable
debates about the correct ethical course.4" On the assumption that their
fund members hold diverse ethical views on social and environmental
issues, they conclude that it would be impossible to reach a consensus to
guide investment policy. Alternatively, the maximization of financial
returns is considered by fund managers as a clear and easily measurable
benchmark to which they should be held to account.
Corporate environmental performance is thus no longer
commonly evaluated against uncompromising ethical standards such as
the value of maintaining the integrity of the global climate. Rather,
environmental problems including climate change impacts are
35 Kirk Makin, High-Stakes Battle Looms Over Oil-Sands Pollution, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 15,
2007, at Al.
36 See SUSAN MCGEACHIE ET AL., FINANCE AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN NORTH AMERICA: THE
STATE OF PLAY OF THE INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES INTO FINANCIAL RESEARCH 8
(2005).
37 SUSANNAH GOODMAN & TIM LITTLE, THE GAP IN GAAP: AN EXAMINATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING LOOPHOLES 6, 20-22 (2003).
38 See Benjamin J. Richardson, Putting Ethics into Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for
Ethical Investment, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 252-53 (2008).
31 See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUs DERINGER, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 72
(2005), available at
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/freshfields-legal-resp20051123.pdf.
40 See generally PENSION FUND POLITICS: THE DANGERS OF SOCIAL INVESTING (Jon Entine ed.,
2005).
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conceptualized as challenges of financial risk management. But only
those risks that are deemed to be "financially material" (i.e., posing
tangible risks to investment assets or lucrative investment opportunities)
receive attention.4' For example, the International Investors Group on
Climate Change (IIGCC) proclaims its goals are to:
* Promote better understanding of the implications of climate
change amongst our members and other institutional investors.
" Encourage companies and markets in which IIGCC members
invest to address any material risks and opportunities to their
businesses associated with climate change and a shift to a lower
42carbon economy.
By contrast, the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility
(ICCR), a North American group that coordinates SRI among ethically-
driven religious investors, explains that its Global Warming Working
Group will:
" Encourage companies to report on their global warming
emissions "footprints", as well as disclose global warming
related risks and opportunities to shareholders; and
* In recognition of future limits on global warming pollutants,
encourage companies to behave proactively by reducing
greenhouse gas emissions to sustainable levels.43
The ICCR goes further than the IIGCC by stressing the priority
of reducing GHG emissions. It aims to prevent or mitigate global
warming as a valuable goal in its own right, not merely as a means to
enhance or protect shareholder value.
The shifting rationale for SRI has been paralleled by
complementary changes in its methods. The strict exclusionary
screening and shareholder activism that were characteristic of the
" U.N. Env't Program Fin. Initiative [UNEP FI], The Materiality of Social, Environmental and
Corporate Governance Issues in Equity Pricing (2004) (prepared by Brokerage House
Analysts).
42 Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change, http://www.iigcc.org (last visited Sept.11,
2009).
43 Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Issues,
http://wwww.iccr.org/issues/globalwarm/goalsobjectives.php (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
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sometimes belligerent style of SRI in the 1970s and 1980s have given
way to more polite, flexible, and inclusive methods of responsible
investing. Thus, rather than divesting from entire industry sectors, social
investors now tend to select those firms that are "best-of-sector."" This
inclusive approach follows from the assumption that corporate
environmental and social behavior should be judged relative to an
industry sector's average performance because only firms operating in
the same sector face comparable sustainability challenges. Investors
holding long-term positions in the market also sometimes prefer to
influence corporate behavior from within through exercise of shareholder
rights and dialogue.45 In place of forceful shareholder advocacy, social
investors today often prefer courteous engagement with corporate
management and behind-the-scenes, informal dialogue.
III. SRI AS A MEANS OF CLIMATE GOVERNANCE
A. VOLUNTARY CODES OF CONDUCT
A further seminal change in SRI, which is particularly evident in
the field of climate finance, is the sector's issuance of a range of codes of
conduct that have sought to provide more systemic governance of the
market. These voluntary mechanisms, drafted by both market and civil
society institutions, have proliferated in the last decade (as detailed in
Table I below).46 Their emergence coincided with the development of
some official regulations to stimulate SRI, such as requirements
introduced in some European countries for pension funds to disclose
their policies for SRI.47 Thus, the financial sector's initiative to sponsor
its own SRI codes of conduct was quite possibly a measure to preempt
any further unwelcome intensification of governmental regulation of
investment choices, given that other voluntary environmental codes of
44 Timo W.M. van den Brink & Frans van der Woerd, Industry Specific Sustainability Benchmarks:
An ECSF Pilot Bridging Corporate Sustainability with Social Responsible Investments, 55 J.
BUS. ETHICS 187 (2004).
45 Rory Sullivan & Craig Mackenzie, Shareholder Activism on Social, Ethical and Environmental
Issues: An Introduction, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 150, 150 (2006).
46 See Oren Perez, The New Universe of Green Finance: From Self-Regulation to Multi-Polar
Governance, in RESPONSIBLE BuSINESS: SELF-GOVERNANCE IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC
TRANSACTIONS 151, 160 (Olaf Dilling et al. eds., 2008).
47 Benjamin J. Richardson, Pensions Law Reform and Environmental Policy: A New Role for
Institutional Investors?, 3 J. INT'L FIN. MARKETS: L. & REG. 159, 162-63 (2002).
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conduct have been shown to be introduced by businesses often to avoid
mandatory regulation. 8
TABLE 1: SRI-RELATED CODES OF CONDUCT
Code of Conduct Principal Sponsor
Carbon Principles, 2008 Consortium of US banks
Climate Principles, 2008 Climate Group
CERES Principles, 1989 Coalition for Environmentally
Responsible Economies (CERES)
Collevecchio Declaration on Coalition of nongovernmental
Financial Institutions, 2003 organizations
Equator Principles, 2003 Consortium of multinational banks and
the World Bank's International
Finance Corporation
Eurosif Transparency Guidelines, European Social Investment Forum
2004 (Eurosif)
Global Sullivan Principles, 1977 Reverend Leon Sullivan
London Principles of Sustainable UK Department of Environment and
Finance, 2002 Corporation of London
UN Principles for Responsible United Nations
Investment, 2005
UNEP Statement by Financial United Nations Environment Program
Institutions on the Environment and Finance Initiative (UNEPFI)
Sustainable Development, 1997
These SRI codes of conduct, if widely ratified and implemented
earnestly, may enhance the capacity of the financial sector to influence
corporate environmental behavior. Until now, the SRI sector has
remained a boutique niche of the financial economy;49 and, as corporate
48 Stepan Wood, Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR
SUSTAINABILITY 229, 250 (Benjamin Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006).
49 In the US, it has been estimated that about II percent of the capital markets are dedicated to SRI
causes. See SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, 2007 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES iv, 52-56 (2008). Yet the surveys likely greatly exaggerate the
size of the SRI sector because they use overly inclusive definitions and insubstantial
methodologies that allow much finance to be treated as socially responsible. See EUROPEAN
SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT AMONG EUROPEAN
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2006) available at
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finance theory predicts,5" it has lacked the capacity to alter the cost of
capital of targeted firms and therefore to create a financial incentive for
them to act more responsibly. The most comprehensively studied action
is the South African divestment campaign, which had a modest effect on
the targeted companies.5 The more recent widespread divestment from
the tobacco industry also appears to have had only a slight affect on their
stock prices."
The SRI codes of conduct embrace a range of methods and
objectives, which are broadly classifiable into four types (although any
individual instrument code may contain several of these features). First,
there are normative frameworks that set substantive performance
standards for social and environmental conduct. One example is the
Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions of 2003, which
requires signatories to actively promote sustainable development. 3
Second, process standards, enabling the assessment, verification, and
communication of performance, constitute another form of market
governance. Examples include the Equator Principles54 and the Global
Reporting Initiative.5  Third, management systems, such as the
International Organization for Standardization's ISO 14001 regime,
create a structure to guide organizations' management of their
environmental and social activities and impacts.56 Organizations that
successfully follow this management regime may be formally certified
by the ISO. Finally, comparative evaluation mechanisms have been
developed by the SRI industry to evaluate and rank corporate
http://www.euroesif.org/media/files/eurosif-sristudy-2006_complete.pdf, for details about the
SRI market in Western Europe.
50 Michael Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims
Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 Bus. LAW. 681 (2002).
51 Siew Teoh, et al., The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets:
Evidence from the South African Boycott, 72 THE J. OF BUS. 35 (1999). Compare Raman Kumar
et al., The End of South African Sanctions, Institutional Ownership, and the Stock Price of
Boycotted Firms, 41 Bus. & Soc. 133 (2002).
52 See, e.g., RICHARDSON, supra note 29, at 168 (citations omitted).
53 BankTrack, Collevecchio Declaration: The Role and Responsibility of Financial Institutions, 2-3,
http://www.banktrack.org/download/collevecchio_declaration
_with-signatories/030401_collevecchio_declarationwith-signatories.pdf (last visited Dec. 26,
2009).
5 The "Equator Principles", http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/Equator..Principles.pdf
(last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
55 See Global Reporting Initiative, What is GRI?,
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRlI/WhatlsGR (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
56 See generally CASE STUDIES AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES (Ruth Hillary ed., 2000).
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performance for the purpose of selecting investments. These rating
mechanisms include SRI stock market indexes such as the Dow Jones
Sustainability Indexes57 and the FTSE4Good Index Series. 8 The criteria
for inclusion in the indexes provide a means of ordering the market and
defining standards for socially conscious firms to aspire to.
Overall, the increasing accommodation of corporate self-
regulation found in most Western economies in recent decades is also
evident in the SRI industry. The trend has been analyzed extensively in
the literature, which need not be repeated in depth here. 9 It should be
noted that many commentators and policy-makers are skeptical of
corporate intentions and doubt that voluntary mechanisms can provide a
credible means of environmental regulation.6" This concern is
particularly applicable to the SRI codes, given that they tend to be very
ambiguous and open-ended in their expectations. The most demanding
standards are contained in the Collevecchio Declaration, a product of
civil society institutions, which has been largely ignored by mainstream
investors. The financial community has favored discretionary or
procedural-based standards dealing with disclosure, reporting, and
auditing of investment activities. While some reflexive law scholars
believe that such measures can induce positive changes in affected
organizations' behavior6' by encouraging their reflection and learning,
the empirical evidence is inconclusive.6" Voluntary mechanisms also
typically lack credible sanctions or enforcement mechanisms so that
57 See Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, http://www.sustainability-index.com (last visited Sept. 14,
2009).
58 See FTSE4Good Index Series, http:www.ftse.comL/Indices/FTSE4Good-Index-Series/index.jsp
(last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
'9 See, e.g., Stepan Wood, Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 229, 229 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006);
Robert B. Gibson, Preface to VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES: THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE
GREENING, at vii, viii (Robert B. Gibson ed., 1999).
60 See, e.g., Ian Maitland, The Limits of Business Self-Regulation, 27 CAL. MGMT. REV. 132
(1985); Wood, supra note 59.
61 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF
SELF-ORGANIZATION I (Gunther Teubner et al. eds., 1994).
62 E.g., Martina Vidovic & Neha Khanna, Can Voluntary Pollution Prevention Programs Fulfill
Their Promises? Further Evidence from the EPA's 33/50 Program, 53 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 180 (2007); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLIMATE CHANGE: EPA AND DOE
SHOULD DO MORE TO ENCOURAGE PROGRESS UNDER Two VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS 32 (2006).
See also Charles Levinson & John Wooding, Introduction to CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY FAILURES IN THE OIL INDUSTRY, v, vii (Charles Woolfson & Matthias Beck
eds., 2005) (describing the oil industry's image manipulation through corporate social
responsibility initiatives).
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compliance has come to depend on peer pressure, the discipline of the
market, or sustained demands from nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). BankTrack, an NGO based in Belgium, has been the most
vociferous critic of investors' compliance with the SRI codes.63
The SRI codes of conduct are imbued with the same business
case values of the contemporary SRI movement generally. The work of
the United Nations Environment Program's Finance Initiative (UJNEPFI),
which is an industry partnership coordinated by the UN to promote SRI
and which sponsored the UNEP Statement by Financial Institutions on
the Environment and Sustainable Development, illustrates this tendency.
It explains in its advisory report, Show Me the Money, that: "[t]he first -
and arguably for investors the most important - reason to integrate [SRI]
issues is, simply, to make more money."'  The UNEPFI believes that
companies' social and environmental performance can increasingly be
accurately financially quantified and valued, thus justifying this
approach. Another UNEPFI publication thus advises financial analysts
to "[c]ommunicate on issue-specific, proven, quantifiable, material links
to business value; [and to] avoid moral arguments."65 Such advice may
simply reflect a pragmatic decision that the financial sector is unlikely to
voluntarily prioritize social and environmental causes and will only be
induced to act responsibly if it believes that it is in its economic self-
interest.
B. THE CLIMATE PRINCIPLES AND CARBON PRINCIPLES
Because of the relative complexity of climate change as an
investment issue and the belief that climate change should be prioritized
over other potential environmental concerns of social investors, some
voluntary codes and standards have been drafted specifically for the
climate finance market. The first such initiative was UNEPFI's
"Declaration on Climate Change by the Financial Services Sector" issued
in 2007; the Declaration called on financial institutions to take greater
action and to integrate climate change considerations into their decision-
63 See, e.g., BANKTRACK, PRINCIPLES, PROFITS OR JUST PR? TRIPLE P INVESTMENTS UNDER THE
EQUATOR PRINCIPLES: AN ANNIVERSARY ASSESSMENT (2004).
64 U.N. Env't Programme, Fin. Initiative [UNEP FI] Asset Mgmt. Working Group, Show Me the
Money: Linking Environmental, Social and Governance Issues to Company Value, 4 (2006).
65 U.N. Env't Programme Fin. Initiative [UNEP FI] & The World Bus. Council for Sustainable
Dev., Young Managers Team, Generation Lost: Young Financial Analysts and Environmental,
Social and Governance Issues, 5 (2004).
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making including to reduce their carbon footprint.66 However, since the
Declaration did not provide a detailed framework to guide investors in
addressing climate change, efforts to develop further codes and standards
continued.
The "Climate Principles: A Framework for the Financial Sector"
were adopted to "provide a common global standard of best practice not
only to assist the finance sector in managing its own climate impact but
also to assist the sector in supporting its clients and stakeholders in
managing their own impacts."67 The Climate Principles were finalized in
December 2008 by the Climate Group, a coalition of NGOs and
businesses, in dialogue with some twenty financial institutions. The
preamble to the Climate Principles explains that: "[i]n our capacity as
advisors, lenders, investors and insurers, we are in a position to play a
stewardship role by assisting the individuals, companies and projects we
help finance, and clients that we offer insurance cover to, to understand
and manage the risks, opportunities and adaptation needs relating to
climate change. 68 The initial signatories to the Climate Principles were
Credit Agriole, HSBC, Standard Chartered, Munich Re, and Swiss Re.
Unlike most other SRI codes of conduct, the Climate Principles
are tailored to specific parts of the finance industry including investment
management, retail banking, insurance, and project finance. Signatory
retail banks are asked to address customer willingness for tackling global
warming and the barriers currently hindering them from taking action.
The insurance sector is expected to advise clients on climate risks and
GHG mitigation technologies. Investment and corporate banks should
facilitate investment in low carbon technologies and GHG reduction
projects, as well as assess the climate consequences of their investments.
Further, investment banks are expected to strengthen expertise to support
trading in GHG emission allowances, weather derivatives, carbon offset
credits, and other climate related commodities. For financiers of projects
that involve the release of at least 100,000 tons of CO 2 (carbon dioxide)
equivalent annually, the banks are expected to request that their clients
66 U.N. Env't Programme Finance Initiative [UNEP FI], Climate Change Working Group,
Declaration on Climate Change by the Financial Services Sector, 1 (June, 2007), available at
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/cc-statement-jun2007.pdf.
67 The Climate Group, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.theclimategroup.org/about/corporate-leadership/climate-principles (last visited Sept.
17, 2009).
's The Climate Principles I (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.theclimategroup.org/assets/resources/TCP-
English.pdf.
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"quantify and disclose" GHG emissions associated with the project, to
"monitor and report GHG emissions annually in accordance with
internationally-recognised methodologies," and to "evaluate technically
and financially feasible options to reduce or offset project-related GHG
emissions."69
The Climate Principles provide more specific and tangible
performance standards than most SRI codes of conduct. Yet, like its
peers, the Climate Principles lack public reporting and compliance
standards. Signatories are not specifically required to report on their
progress toward implementing the Principles, and there are no sanctions
for failure to make meaningful progress. The Climate Principles focus
on the banking and insurance sectors and do not directly address
institutional investors such as pension plans and investment companies.
While it is essential to improve climate risk and mitigation strategies in
the lending and insurance services, much of the financing of the fossil
fuel and energy sectors is undertaken by institutional investors through
the equity markets.
The principal benefit of the Climate Principles will likely be to
put signatories in the spotlight, making them more vulnerable to scrutiny
from their peers and environmental NGOs. There is some early evidence
that some signatories are taking their responsibilities seriously. The
HSBC has apparently started to sever financial relationships with clients
in the forestry sector in countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia that
lack rigorous environmental controls.7" The Climate Group, which
drafted the Principles, has committed itself to regularly monitoring
implementation of the Climate Principles and to providing a forum
through working groups and other collaborative mechanisms for various
stakeholders to be involved in overseeing the dissemination of the
Climate Principles.7'
The Climate Principles build on the Carbon Principles, adopted
in February 2008 by six U.S. banks. They aim to "provide a consistent
approach for banks and their US power clients to evaluate and address
carbon risks in the financing of electric power projects. 72
69 id.
70 James Murray, Banks Go Cold on Most Polluting Firms, BUSINESS GREEN, Dec. 5, 2008,
http://www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2232071/banks-cold-polluting-firms.
71 The Climate Group, Update on the Climate Principles, (Feb., 2009),
http://www.theclimategroup.org/assets/resources/CPUpdate_-_February_2009.pdf.
72 The Carbon Principles, http://carbonprinciples.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
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Commendably, the Carbon Principles were prepared by the banks during
a nine-month consultation with the Environmental Defense, Natural
Resources Defense Council, and several U.S. power utilities.73 Yet,
similarly to the Climate Principles, the Carbon Principles emphasize
procedural standards rather than mandatory performance standards, such
as prohibitions on the financing of fossil fuel-intensive developments or
companies. Consequently, the Carbon Principles potentially provide
latitude for business-as-usual. The three specific commitments of the
Carbon Principles are to:
" Encourage clients to pursue cost-effective energy efficiency,
renewable energy and other low carbon alternatives to
conventional generation, taking into consideration the potential
value of avoided CO2 emissions.
* Ascertain and evaluate the financial and operational risk to fossil
fuel generation financings posed by the prospect of domestic
CO2 emissions controls through the application of the Enhanced
Diligence Process. Use the results of this diligence as a
contribution to the determination whether a transaction is
eligible for financing and under what terms.
" Educate clients, regulators, and other industry participants
regarding the additional diligence required for fossil fuel
generation financings, and encourage regulatory and legislative
changes consistent with the Principles.
74
The accompanying Enhanced Diligence Process (EDP) applies
to financing sought by both public and private sector entities for
construction of fossil fuel generation facilities of at least two hundred
mega-watt capacity. 75  Given that the banks recognized the virtual
inevitability of governmental controls on GHG emissions during the life
of new power plants, the EDP seeks to "identify potential risks posed by
the recognized cost of CO2 emissions."76 Thus, the EDP requires the
73 Leora Falk, Three U.S. Banks Develop Guidelines to Protect Against Climate Change Risk, 39
ENV'T REP. 261 (2008).
74 The Carbon Principles, http://carbonprinciples.org/documents/Carbon%20Principles.pdf, (last
visited Sept. 17, 2009).
75 The Carbon Principles: Fossil Fuel Generation Financing Enhanced Environmental Diligence
Process 3, http://www.morganstanley.com/global/carbon-principles-diligence.pdf (last visited
Sept. 17, 2009).
76 Id. at 1.
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banks to: evaluate specific environmental, economic, and technical issues
in light of the regulation that may be imposed upon the project; assess
the borrower's GHG mitigation plans; conduct an independent
assessment of the borrower's risks from potential costs associated with
GHG controls; and encourage the borrower to consult with affected
stakeholders either through a public regulatory process or through the
borrower's project planning process. Further, each bank must
periodically disclose the methods by which it implements the EDP. The
Carbon Principles state that if a borrower is unwilling to provide the
requested information for the EDP, "the financial institution will not
proceed with the financing" - the closest the Principles come to
embodying a substantive environmental performance standard."
The Carbon Principles and the EDP illustrate how the private
sector can take the lead in anticipation of regulatory actions targeting
GHG emissions. While we may wish to laud such financiers for taking
the lead over the U.S. government, it should not be forgotten that U.S.
business groups including financial organizations have long sought to
stonewall regulatory action to tackle GHG emissions along with many
other environmental problems."8 The corporate sector normally is only
prepared to deal with the environmental externalities of the market on
terms that do not unduly disturb business-as-usual. The only domain
where financiers have acted ambitiously is in relation to environmental
reporting, probably because improved environmental information can
dovetail closely with better financial risk management." 9
C. CLIMATE-RELATED REPORTING STANDARDS
Thus, the most beneficial and effective SRI governance codes to
date are those that aim to improve disclosure of corporate social and
environmental behavior. Several such codes have been designed
specifically to solicit climate-related information. Social investors need
to know about companies' GHG emissions if they are to construct
environmentally responsible investment portfolios. The current lack of
well-established legal obligations to report such information, coupled
" Id. at 4.
78 Charles A. Jones & Donald L. Levy, North American Business Strategies Towards Climate
Change, 25 EUR. MGMT. J. 428,428 (2007).
79 See UNEP F1, supra note 40, at 40, for a discussion on the importance of financiers' access to
information on corporate environmental performance.
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with the lack of comprehensive, standardized methods for reporting such
emissions on a voluntary basis, has hindered SRI on climate issues.8"
Further, companies facing material climate-related financial risks are
disinclined to disclose fully such information.8 In some jurisdictions
such as the UK and the U.S., general corporate financial reporting laws
require companies to disclose any costs or benefits associated with their
environmental performance that might affect the firm's financial health.8"
Lackluster implementation of such standards, owing partly to lax
regulatory oversight and lack of precision in regulatory standards, has
encouraged the SRI industry to develop its own reporting protocols.
Among its initiatives are the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and the
Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative (GHGPI).83 They generate data that
help facilitate dialogue between financial institutions and firms on
climate change.
The CDP is a transparency mechanism that coordinates requests
from institutional investors for information on companies' climate
change-related activities.84 Launched in December 2000, the CDP allows
investors to collectively endorse a single global request for disclosure of
information regarding companies' GHG emissions, vulnerability to
climate change impacts, carbon emission trading activities, and their
policies on climate change. These requests are made annually to an ever-
larger pool of major companies. By mid 2008, over three thousand
corporations were asked to report to the CDP, on behalf of nearly four
hundred investment institutions.85 About half responded. Since 2007,
the CDP has also asked for information about companies' emissions
connected to their supply chains, thereby helping to provide a more
80 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & INT'L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS'N, UNCERTAINTY IN
ACCOUNTING FOR THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND CERTIFIED EMISSION REDUCTIONS
15-16 (2007).
81 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, A CHANGE IN THE CLIMATE: Is BUSINESS GOING GREEN? 8
(2006).
82 E.g. CAN. PERFORMANCE REPORTING BD., MD&A DISCLOSURE ABOUT THE FINANCIAL IMPACT
OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 9 (2005); Jeffrey Smith, The
Implications of the Kyoto Protocol and the Global Warming Debate for Business Transaction, 1
N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 511, 529 (2005); MICHELLE CHAN-FISHEL, FIFTH SURVEY OF CLIMATE
CHANGE DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILING OF AUTOMOBILE, INSURANCE, OIL AND GAS,
PETROCHEMICAL, AND UTILITIES COMPANIES 6-7 (2006).
83 Carbon Disclosure Project, http://www.cdproject.net (last visited Sept. 17, 2009); The
Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative, http://www.ghgprotocol.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
84 See Carbon Disclosure Project, supra note 83.
85 Carbon Disclosure Project, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.cdproject.net (last visited
Sept. 17, 2009).
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comprehensive picture of GHG pollution.86 The CDP is the largest
registry of corporate GHG emissions data in the world, for the benefit of
numerous institutional investors.87 While reporting to the CDP is a
voluntary process, some participating companies are probably motivated
by the desire to avoid unwelcome pressure and adverse publicity from
investors if they decline to cooperate.88 Others that are making good
progress in reducing their carbon footprint are likely attracted by the
opportunity to gain publicity for their efforts.89
While the CDP is a mechanism to collect data, the GHGPI seeks
to improve how data are gathered and accounted for.9" An initiative of
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the World
Resources Institute, the GHGPI consists of two modules. The Corporate
Accounting and Reporting Standard Module assists companies and other
organizations to identify, calculate, and report GHG emissions. A
limitation of the modules in relation to financial institutions is that they
do not have to account for the GHG emissions of their borrowers (the
latter are deemed to be the "responsible entities" for reporting). The
second GHGPI module is the Project Accounting Protocol and
Guidelines, designed for calculating reductions in GHG emissions from
specific projects and land use changes. The GHGPI has become widely
accepted, and it provides the accounting framework for the European
Union's Emissions Trading Scheme and other initiatives.9"
Some other disclosure regimes utilize the CDP and GHGPI. One
example is the World Economic Forum's Global Greenhouse Gas
Register (GHG Register), established to provide a global inventory of
corporate emissions and reduction targets.92 The Global Reporting
86 See Carbon Disclosure Project, CDP Supply Chain, https://www.cdproject.net/en-
US/Programmes/Pages/CDP-Supply-Chain.aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
87 Press Release, Carbon Disclosure Project, World's Largest Investor Coalition representing $41
Trillion Seeks Further Disclosure on Climate Change and Shareholder Value From World's
Largest Corporations (Feb. 1, 2007).
8 But see Elizabeth Stanny & Kirsten Ely, Corporate Environmental Disclosures About the Effects
of Climate Change, 15 CORP. SOC. RESP. AND ENVTL. MGMT. 338, 339, 347 (2008) (discussing
resistance to disclosure).
9 See id.
9o See The Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative, supra note 83.
91 See The Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative, Users of the Corporate Standard,
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/standards/corporate-standard/users-of-the-corporate-standard (last
visited Sept. 5, 2009).
92 See World Economic Forum, Global Greenhouse Gas Register,
http://www2.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Global+Greenhouse+Gas+Register.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
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Initiative, to some observers the gold standard for sustainability
reporting,93 contains directions on reporting relevant information
regarding climate change.94 The Global Reporting Initiative's G3
Reporting Framework of October 2006 introduced a specific reporting
indicator on the "financial implications due to climate change."95
Another initiative also informed by the GHGPI is the ISO 14064
standard, released in March 2006. It aims to promote consistency,
transparency, and credibility in GHG emission quantification, reporting,
and verification in order to facilitate trade in GHG allowances and
credits.96 The ISO 14064 is complemented by ISO 14065, containing
requirements to accredit or recognize bodies that undertake GHG
validation or verification.97
Together, these accounting and reporting mechanisms furnish
one of the most significant contributions of the financial sector to
addressing climate change. Transparency is a tool to promote scrutiny
and evaluation, and even if financiers make conservative uses of the
information, other stakeholders such as environmental NGOs can find
them a crucial resource for monitoring and challenging corporations.
Such improved transparency provides a rare example of where SRI can
provide leadership, setting an example for others including governments
to follow. These successes likely owe to the fact that they hardly require
any changes in the behavior of financial institutions themselves, changes
are only required of the companies they fund. While there has been
93 E.g., Oren Perez, Facing the Global Hydra: Ecological Transformation of the Global Financial
Frontier: The Ambitious Case of the Global Reporting Initiative, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 459 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006).
94 See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES (2006), available
at http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/ED9E9B36-AB54-4DE I -BFF2-
5F735235CA44/01G3_GuidelinesENU.pdf
9 See id. at 26.
96 It comprises three specific standards: ISO 14064-1:2006, Greenhouse Gases -Part 1, available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber-38381 ("Specification with guidance at the
organization level for the quantification and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions and
removals."); ISO 14064-2:2006, Greenhouse Gases - Part 2 available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/cataloguedetail?csnumber-38381 ("Specification with guidance at the
project level for the quantification, monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emission
reductions and removal enhancements."); ISO 14064-3:2006, Greenhouse Gases - Part 3,
available at http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue-detail?csnumber=38381 ("Specification with
guidance for the validation and verification of greenhouse gas assertions.").
I7 150 14065:2007, Greenhouse Gases, available at
http://www.iso.orgiiso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=40685 ("Requirements for greenhouse gas
validation and verification bodies for use in accreditation or other forms of recognition.").
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some industry resistance to increased opacity on the basis of cost and
potential utility, the financial sector has been able to leverage change
through its economic power coupled with the industry's anticipation of
possible increased governmental disclosure regulation. The transparency
trend in SRI governance has coincided with the rising clamor in many
other policy contexts for transparency in economic, financial, and
business activities, including auditing and accounting standards, national
fiscal practices, and multilateral development assistance.98
Disclosure standards are sometimes welcomed by the market
because they redress information asymmetry among actors, thereby
promoting capital market efficiency.99 Specifically, they help investors
to make informed decisions about the risks and benefits at stake. In this
sense, they dovetail with the business case approach to SRI.
Furthermore, improved disclosure may yield environmental management
benefits. Reflexive law theorists contend that environmental auditing
and reporting processes can help reform the organizational culture of
businesses from within by encouraging greater reflection, learning, and
behavioural changes. '00
D. OTHER SRI CODES OF CONDUCT
There are a growing number of other codes of conduct devised
by the financial sector for promoting SRI generally. While none deal
specifically with climate change, nearly all of them are generically
relevant to the task of encouraging financiers to act more
environmentally responsibly. This section of the Article assesses two
codes that take different approaches to governing SRI, namely the United
Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) and the
Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions (CDFI).
Catering primarily to institutional investors, the UNPRI
predominantly contain process standards to encourage SRI. The
Principles were drafted under the auspices of UNEPFI, which used a
two-tiered process comprising an inner working group of invited
98 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 162-169 (2000).
99 Ashan Habib, Corporate Transparency, Financial Development and the Allocation of Capital:
Empirical Evidence, 44 ABACUS 1(2008).
10o Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Coping with Uncertainty: Ecological Risks and Proceduralization of
Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
60, at 299, 322-23.
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investment professionals and a wider multi-stakeholder advisory group
that included representatives from some major environmental NGOs.
A succinct code, the UNPRI are just six core principles, each one
is illustrated by several possible actions. The principles are:
1) We will incorporate environmental, social and corporate
governance (ESG) issues into investment analysis and decision-
making processes.
2) We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our
ownership policies and practices.
3) We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the
entities in which we invest.
4) We will promote acceptance and implementation of the
Principles within the investment industry.
5) We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in
implementing the Principles.
6) We will each report on our activities and progress towards
implementing the Principles. 1Ol
Clearly, the UNPRI fall far short of providing a comprehensive
framework for promoting SRI, let alone for addressing climate change
specifically. Among the list of conceivable actions for the first principle,
there is no stated expectation that investors actually incorporate social or
environmental factors into their ultimate portfolios. The UNPRI
principles do not require a signatory to demonstrate any particular
performance standards with regard to human rights or environmental
protection. Conceivably, therefore, a UNPRI signatory could continue to
invest in the fossil fuel industry and satisfy principle one by merely
reviewing the direct financial risks posed by global warming.
The second principle on active ownership focuses on
participation in investee companies, while curiously ignoring the
pressing need to also democratize decision-making within financial
institutions. Among the accompanying list of possible actions to the
101 See Principles for Responsible Investment, http://www.unpri.org/principles (last visited Sept. 6,
2009).
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UNPRI principles, the suggested actions for implementing principle two
on active ownership include "exercise voting rights," "develop an
engagement capability," and "file shareholder resolutions consistent with
long-term ESG considerations."' 0' 2 Financiers sometimes file shareholder
resolutions to spur corporate management to meet their demands on
climate change issues, such as asking companies to report their GHG
emissions or how they propose to reduce them. Such resolutions on
environmental subjects are generally rare and have garnered little open
support until recently. °3 Most such resolutions have been filed in the
U.S.; the 2008 proxy season featured fifty-seven climate change-related
shareholder resolutions filed in American companies,0 4 up from twenty-
five such resolutions in 2003. These resolutions typically garner ten to
twelve percent of shareholder votes. Thus, the UNPRI's advice on active
ownership at least helpfully counters the long-standing passive nature of
much institutional investment.
But such recommendations, like the rest of the UNPRI, are not
backed by any compliance machinery. The UNPRI do not provide an
independent audit or verification mechanism to assess the quality of
signatories' implementation, a curious omission given how the financier
sector in other contexts such as the CDP is so insistent on opacity by the
firms they fund. While the UNPRI do not explicitly refer to climate
change, conceivably it is the type of environmental issue that signatories
to the UNPRI principles should address. The UNPRI Secretariat does
not appear yet to have established any working groups or projects that
focus on global warming." 5  Some individual UNPRI signatories
mention how they use the principles to inform their policies. For
example, the Australian financial group AMP Capital states that it "is
progressively applying the UNPRI to our investment activities across all
asset classes...: on the potential risks and issues around policy response
102 id.
103 Robert Monks et al., Shareholder Activism on Environmental Issues: A Study of Proposals at
Large U.S. Corporations (2000-2003), 28 NAT. RESOURCES. F. 317, 319 (2004).
104 Investor Network on Climate Risk, Investors Achieve Major Company Commitments on Climate
Change, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.incr.com/Page.aspx?pid=227.
105 By contrast, the UNEPFI has a Climate Change Work Stream. See UNEP Finance Initiative,
Work Streams, http://www.unepfi.org/work-streams/climate-change/index.html (last visited
Dec. 26, 2009).
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to climate change."' 6 However, most financiers ostensibly interested in
SRI typically are signatories to several codes and regimes, and they do
not purport to attribute actions on climate change or other environmental
issues to any one standard such as the UNPRI. Thus, it can be difficult
to isolate the effect of the UNPRI from other SRI codes or other factors.
Nonetheless, by accommodating rather than radically
challenging the financial sector, the UNPRI will likely remain one of the
main benchmarks for SRI. As of June 2008, over 350 institutions had
signed the UNPRI principles, holding more than US$14 trillion in
assets.'° 7 The UNPRI have been generally well-received by the finance
sector, it being attracted to their sponsorship by the eminent UN while
leaving signatories with considerable latitude to implement the open-
ended standards.
In contrast, the CDFI has attracted little interest from financiers.
Indeed, only one major financial institution, the California Public
Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), is among the approximately
one hundred signatories to the CDFI.' 8 It was drafted in 2003 by a
coalition of NGOs critical of the facile standards found in some other
SRI codes of conduct. Encapsulating civil society's vision of
sustainability for the finance sector, the CDFI is comprised of six
principles that stress accountability, transparency, and stakeholder rights.
Specifically, the CDFI requires financiers' commitment to:
sustainability, "no harm," responsibility, accountability, transparency,
and sustainable markets and governance.' 9  The accompanying
implementation guide outlines immediate steps that financial institutions
should take, such as the adoption of internationally recognized industry
standards for credit, investing, and underwriting transactions." 0
The CDFI differs from other normative standards in its rigorous
and detailed requirements. The ambitious "commitment to sustainability"
principle obliges investors to:
106 AMP Capital Investors, AMP Capital a signatory to the United Nations Principles of Responsible
Investment, http://www.ampcapital.com.au/corporatecentre/unpri.asp (last visited Dec. 26,
2009).
107 U.N. Env't Program Fin. Initiative [UNEP FI], PRI Reports on Progress 2008 2 (2008). The
value of such assets was no doubt affected by the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing global
recession.
108 BankTrack, supra note 53, at 8.
-o Id. at 2-4.
"" Id. at 4.
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... expand their missions from ones that prioritize profit
maximization to a vision of social and environmental sustainability.
A commitment to sustainability would require financial institutions to
fully integrate the consideration of ecological limits, social equity and
economic justice into corporate strategies and core business areas
(including credit, investing, underwriting, advising), to put
sustainability objectives on an equal footing to shareholder
maximization and client satisfaction, and to actively strive to finance
transactions that promote sustainability. " '
Concomitantly, the CDFI's "do no harm" principle entails an
explicit commitment to categorical prohibitions for the most socially and
environmentally egregious transactions. Such standards, if adopted
widely by financial institutions, would provide a strong platform to
address climate change as a valuable goal in its own right. The
implementation guidance to the CDFI usefully elaborates on these
principles and gives financiers specific advice for promoting
environmentally sound financing."2  For example, concerning the
"Commitment to Transparency," it recommends that financial
institutions "publish annual sustainability reports," which should provide
"a breakdown of core business activity by sector and region, and the
implementation of the financial institution's sustainability policies and
objectives."" 3
These and other Collevecchio standards offer a framework for
ethically guided SRI. That framework is surely too demanding for most
financiers to accept voluntarily. The CDFI, however, retains its value as
a point of reference to assess the ethical adequacy of other standards and
codes, and in guiding necessary governmental regulation as the following
section explains.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE
FINANCE
The global financial crisis during 2008 and 2009 has put the
basic structure and architecture of financial markets under unprecedented
scrutiny and generated calls for comprehensive reform of financial
markets that go beyond merely the targeting of unscrupulous
. Id. at 3.
112 Id. at 3-4.
"' Id. at 6-7.
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financiers." 4 Systemic changes are demanded. Apart from exposing the
inadequacies of governments' laissez-faire approaches to supervising
financial markets, the current economic crisis also exposes the
impoverished agenda of the SRI movement.' It has traditionally been
preoccupied by ad hoc concerns and individual companies, while largely
ignoring the macro-economic and overall structural issues such as
controls over transnational capital movements. With their often vague
and discretionary standards, the SRI codes of conduct canvassed in this
Article tend to lack the ambition and teeth to remedy this deficiency. The
codes have been developed in the context of a financial industry that has
long been accustomed to focusing only on investment returns and risk
management. Consequently, any social and environmental concerns can
only be legitimately incorporated into that framework in the absence of
mandatory regulation to the extent that they are understood as furthering
the bottom line.
In responding to these challenges, the opportunity must be seized
to inculcate responsibilities of environmental care into the governance
framework for financial markets. Promotion of sustainable development
must be a goal shared by all sectors, especially the financial sector given
that it is where wholesale decisions regarding capital allocation and thus
future development pressures arise. So far, policy-makers and
commentators have generally viewed the financial sector as only a
transactional, intermediary agent in responding to climate finance; in
other words, investment institutions are essentially mere brokers or
passive financiers of measures to mitigate or adapt to climate change. "
6
The potential of the financial sector to take a more ambitious role to
stimulate far-reaching changes in corporate behavior is only just starting
to be seriously explored.
While the financial sector increasingly recognizes that climate
change can be a financially salient consideration, such as a threat to
investment portfolio values or as an opportunity to enhance returns, the
pragmatic, business case approach to SRI does not provide a sufficiently
114 See Soros, supra note 12; Shiller, supra note 12.
" See generally GORDON CLARK & DARIUS WOJCIK, THE GEOGRAPHY OF FINANCE: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (2007).
116 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UN FCCC], Investment and Financial Flows
to Address Climate Change (2008).
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comprehensive framework to deal with global warming. 1'  Some
financiers may judge that climate change is too remote to affect a
company's bottom line, or that there are seemingly more pressing issues
affecting investment values. Another hindrance is the general
uncertainty that financiers face in determining the tangible implications
of climate change, given continuing scientific uncertainties about its
impacts, as well as predicting governmental policy responses to global
warming. For example, presently there is insufficient research
demonstrating the relationship between GHG emission regulations and
investment returns." 8  The struggle to reach an intergovernmental
agreement on GHG emission targets beyond 2012, when the Kyoto
Protocol expires, overshadows the challenges of setting a durable value
on carbon reduction and climate adaptation measures. 19
Two important insights from this exploration of climate finance
can be discerned. Firstly, government policies must set a durable value
for carbon emissions, reflective of their harm to the global climate, if the
SRI market driven solely by the business case is to be a force for change.
The climate finance market will be unable greatly to advance socially
responsible solutions in the absence of such governmental intervention.
This situation has already been recognized by the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development. 20  Because the unregulated
market struggles to capture and reflect environmental externalities such
as climate risks, 121 the financing of renewable energy supplies and energy
efficiency technologies "generally entail higher risks and initial costs
11 U.N. Env't Program Fin. Initiative [UNEP FI], Climate Change Working Group, Climate
Change & the Financial Services Industry 31-34 (2002) (prepared by Innovest).
118 U.N. Env't Program Fin. Initiative [UNEP FI], Climate Risk Disclosure Initiative Steering
Committee, Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure: A Statement of Investor
Expectations for Comprehensive Corporate Disclosure 5 (2006).
119 See John Whalley & Sean Walsh, Bringing the Copenhagen Global Climate Change
Negotiations to a Conclusion (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2458, Nov. 2008), available at
http://www.cesifo-group.de/pls/guestci/download/CESifo%20
Working%20Papers%202008/CESifo%20Working%2OPapers%20November/o202008%20/cesif
ol-wp2458.pdf, on the progress of negotiations.
120 WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2005).
12' For a discussion on such market deficiencies, see the ecological literature. See, e.g., MICHAEL
COMMON, ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMIES: AN INTRODUCTION (2nd ed. 1996);
INVESTING IN NATURAL CAPITAL: THE ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS APPROACH TO
SUSTAINABILITY 92, 93 (Anne Marie Jansson, et al., eds., 1994); KENNETH G. WILLIS ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUATION (1999).
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than conventional projects."' 22  Already, environmental regulation and
litigation risks are emerging as drivers for financiers to factor climate
change into their investment choices. The prospect of carbon emission
caps, carbon taxes, renewable energy subsidies, and mandatory corporate
disclosures on climate impacts, imposed by governments, are becoming
influential for the climate finance market. While some legal
commentators believe that "the probability of legal victories against
global warming is low,"'23 they also concede that such litigation may
generate substantial legal fees and costly delays to new projects.'24 The
dependence of the climate finance market on the broader regulatory
framework demonstrates the paradox of SRI. It arose with aspirations to
be a form of surrogate market regulation, compensating for the lacunae
or weaknesses of official regulation, yet it remains reliant on the state to
set environmental and other standards necessary to make social and
environmental concerns salient to the market.
Another challenge is that the ethical issues posed by climate
change have been insufficiently acknowledged in the SRI movement (let
alone by financial markets generally). Business case SRI, even at its
most efficient, will probably never be a satisfactory solution because it
relies on perpetuating the same economic system premised on infinite
growth that has wrought so much ecological damage in the last
century.'25 An ethical envelope to climate finance, providing a normative
framework to safeguard ecological integrity and ensure social justice in
entitlements to use limited environmental resources is essential.
Humankind's capacity to tamper with the planet's climate raises
profound concern about our exploitative relationship with nature.'26 An
ethic of restraint is needed, if anything at least for the welfare of
posterity. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change proclaims as one of its core principles that: "the Parties should
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
122 See ZhongXiang Zhang & Aki Maruyama, Towards a Private- Public Synergy in Financing
Climate Change Mitigation Projects, 29 ENERGY POL'Y 1363 (2001).
123 MARC LEVINSON, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC., LIABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE (2006).
124 Id. at 1.
125 See generally DONELLA MEADOWS ET.AL., LIMITS TO GROWTH: THE 30-YEAR UPDATE 178
(2004) (discussing the needed limitations on economic growth to protect the environment).
126 Prue Taylor, The Business of Climate Change: What's Ethics Got to Do With It? 20 GLOBAL
Bus. & DEV. L.J. 161 (2007).
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capabilities."'2 7 Further, the question of who should shoulder the
primary burden of addressing climate change raises significant ethical
issues concerning social and economic justice between developing and
developed countries.'28 The global South has maintained in international
negotiations that it should not be required to curtail its economic growth
to address a climatic problem created by the historical GHG emissions of
the North.'29 The financial sector, however, has been able largely to
circumvent such uncomfortable and complex questions by treating
climate change as just an additional variable in the cost-benefit
calculations of investment decision-making and financial transactions.
The underlying perspective and assumptions of the capital investment
processes remain uncritiqued. While there is nothing objectionable to
investors financially benefiting from reducing their carbon footprint, the
dilemma is that the business case will not always provide sufficient
motivation for reform.
In conceiving how to make ethically-driven SRI on climate
change more widespread in financial markets, reform of the fiduciary
duties of investment institutions should be a priority for they frame how
financiers view their basic purposes and to whom they are accountable.
The fiduciary responsibility is particularly entrenched in institutional
investors, such as occupational pension funds, which are required to
invest prudently and impartially in the interests of their beneficiaries. 3°
The managers of such institutional funds thus have a fiduciary duty to
pursue optimal financial returns without regard to collateral social or
environmental concerns. By contrast, in the retail investment market,
individuals investing on their own behalf are much freer to choose
mutual funds or unit trusts that sell portfolios aligned with their social,
environmental, or other values."' In the retail sector, investment policies
more closely reflect contractual arrangements between investors and
fund managers.
127 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Framework Convention on
Climate Change, art. 3.1, May 9, 1992,31 I.L.M. 849.
128 See LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (2006).
129 See Adil Najama et al., Climate Negotiations Beyond Kyoto: Developing Countries Concerns
and Interests, 3 CLIMATE POL'Y 221 (2003).
130 See Stuart Willey, Investment Management and Fiduciary Duties, in LAW AND REGULATION OF
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 237, 237 (Dick Frase ed., 2004).
131 George Djurasovic, The Regulation of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 22 J. CORP. L 257
(1997) (detailing the legal obligations of fund managers in retail funds to investors).
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One option for reform would be to require that fiduciary finance
be accountable to the social and environmental costs it creates. An
overarching legal responsibility to promote sustainable development or
other environmentally sensitive goals could be established to hold
financiers to account. Thereby, the fiduciary obligation to promote
private returns would need to take into account their public costs if not
adequately reflected in conventional environmental regulation. Under
such a regime, a financial institution could be subject to regulatory
penalties for failing to pursue environmentally responsible investments.
Of course, such a fiduciary standard would need to be underpinned by
concrete performance standards if it is to be workable. A vague
stipulation to promote sustainability alone would not suffice. It would
likely be undermined by discretionary interpretations to which financiers
could not be legally challenged. One solution could be to extend the
advances in designing sustainable performance indicators in
environmental policy-making to financial investments.132 One such
indicator is the carbon footprint of an investment portfolio, a potent
indicator of environmental performance.133  Thus, the total GHG
emissions attributable to an investment portfolio could provide a means
to determine whether a financier was investing in accordance with an
environmentally-informed fiduciary standard.
A further tool to underpin a new fiduciary standard is social
accounting, which seeks to assign financial values to the social and
environmental costs and benefits of economic activities. New models of
social accounting have been advanced that attempt to capture the
collateral benefits (e.g., job creation, public infrastructure, and
environmental protection) and collateral costs (e.g., damage to natural
resources and intensification of social inequalities) of economic
activity. '34 Extension of social accounting to investment transactions
would of course be a monumental challenge to the established forms of
132 Justin J. Keeble et al., Using Indicators to Measure Sustainability Performance at a Corporate
and Project Level, 44 J. BUS. ETHICS 149 (2003); OLIVER SCHMID-SCHONBEIN &
ARTHUR BRAUNSCHWEIG, EPI-FINANCE: ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
INDICATORS FOR THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY (2000) available at www.epifinance.com.
's3 See generally TRUCOST, CARBON COUNTS 2007: THE TRUCOST CARBON FOOTPRINT RANKING
OF UK INVESTMENT FUNDS (providing the measurements of carbon footprints in investment
portfolios).
134 Jeffrey Unerman et. al, Introduction to SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1,
2-3 (Jeffrey Unerman et.al. eds., 2007); Daniel Blake Rubenstein, Bridging the Gap Between
Green Accounting and Black Ink, 17 ACCT., ORG. & Soc'Y 501 (1992).
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financial reporting and accounting geared to measuring expenses and
income associated with specific market transactions.
Reforming fiduciary duties alone certainly would not suffice. 35
In addition, decision-making within financial institutions surely should
be democratized, in order to give more voice to ordinary fund members
as well as to outside third parties affected by investments. Changing
governance from within should enable other social values to at least be
considered in investment policy-making. Another reform is to address
the international legal rules governing cross-border finance. The current
global financial malaise has created a window for contemplating reforms
hitherto marginalized from public debate. Ideally, new fiduciary duties
and investment decision-making standards that further sustainable
development should be etched into new international legal rules
governing cross-border finance. The existing range of voluntary
international standards canvassed in this Article such as the UNPRI will
not suffice. The current intergovernmental negotiations over the
Copenhagen Protocol could provide a suitable forum to introduce some
climate finance standards into international climate law.
Overall, while the expansion of SRI into mainstream financial
markets has promised a more responsible approach to investments that
have consequences for climate change, that promise remains unfulfilled.
The SRI codes of conduct have yet to demonstrate that they can resolve
the systemic barriers to ethically-driven climate finance. The dominant
forms of SRI provide a framework for addressing climate change largely
only to the extent that global warming is perceived as financially
material and relevant to the financial objectives of investment
institutions. In some cases, this private self-interest can serve to leverage
beneficial change, such as is already occurring with regard to investors'
pressure for improved corporate disclosure of GHG emissions. But too
often the financial sector will lack the innate motivations to advocate
reform. In an economic system premised on infinite economic growth
sustained by international financial markets, it is hard to see how the
financial economy can voluntarily accept the kind of restraints that a low
carbon economy demands. More official regulation of the climate
finance market is necessary, but it must do more than merely perpetuate
135 See Richardson, supra note 29, at 509-570, for a more comprehensive discussion of SRI legal
reforms.
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a transactional role for financiers; they must be galvanized to be vehicles
for enlightened change.
